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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
SUCCESSIONS AND DONATIONS
Carlos E. Lazarus*
NATURE OF SUCCESSION
Succession is a mode of acquiring the ownership of things.
The term is thus defined in Louisiana Civil Code article 871 as
the transmission of the inheritance to the heirs of the de-
ceased. Depending upon the context in which the term is
used, "succession" means also the inheritance or the pat-
rimony of the deceased, i.e., the property rights and obliga-
tions of the deceased as they existed at the time of his death,'
or the right whereby the heirs take possession of the inheri-
tance. 2 In Jones v. Dibert, Bancroft & Ross Co.,3 the plaintiff,
administratrix of the succession of her deceased father, sought
to compel the defendant corporation, of which the deceased
had been a stockholder, to furnish her the financial reports of
the corporation required to be furnished by Louisiana R.S.
12:102. The issue, as the court presented the case, was whether
the succession of the deceased stockholder could be consid-
ered a stockholder of record and thus assert the rights pre-
scribed by the statute.4 It is well settled, said the court, "that
upon the death of an individual his succession evolves and
exists as a separate and distinct legal entity and will continue
in existence until terminated by proceedings had pursuant to
an administration conducted by an administrator or executor,
or, an unqualified acceptance by the heirs."'5 It therefore con-
cluded that the succession representative had the right to the
information required by the statute.
It would have been more consonant with the concept of
Louisiana law that the patrimony of the deceased is trans-
mitted to his heir at the moment of his death6 to say that the
plaintiff as the heir and juridical representative of the person
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 872-73.
2. Id. art. 874.
3. 308 So. 2d 369 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1975).
4. Id. at 371. For a discussion of the issues which concern the Louisiana
Business Corporations Law, LA. R.S. 12:1-178 (1968), see The Work of the
Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1974-1975 Term-Corporations, 36 LA. L.
REV. 455, 457 (1976).
5. 308 So. 2d at 371.
6. LA. CIV. CODE art. 940.
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of the deceased,7 was entitled to the information required.
The "succession" of the deceased may very well remain a
tangible thing until merged by confusion with the patrimony
of the heir upon the latter's acceptance, but it can hardly be
said that this "succession" is a juridical person or legal enti-
ty. The redactors of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1825 rejected
and discarded the legal entity concept, at one time adopted in
the Digest of Laws of 1808,8 in favor of "le mort saisit le vif."9
COMMORIENTES
The transmission of the succession takes place im-
mediately upon the death of the de cujus, but only persons
living at that time have the capacity to inherit.10 The trans-
mission of the inheritance, therefore, depends upon proof
being made that the successor was alive at the instant of the
death of the de cujus. When two persons reciprocally entitled
to inherit from one another have died at about the same time,
it becomes necessary to establish the order of their deaths,
for, despite the reciprocity of their rights, only the survivor
has the capacity to inherit from the predeceased. If it is
impossible to establish the order of their deaths by positive
proof or by other admissible evidence from which an inference
can be drawn as to the order of their deaths, they are incapa-
ble of succeeding to each other, and their successions will be
transmitted to their other heirs ab intestato, as if neither of
them had survived the other.'
When those who are reciprocally entitled to inherit from
one another perish in the same event, such as a shipwreck or
a conflagration, the Louisiana Civil Code makes a particular
7. Id. art. 884. The word "stockholder" in the statute could have been
construed to include the heirs of the stockholder.
8. La. Digest of 1808, bk. III, ch. VI, sec. I, art. 74: "Until acceptance or
renunciation, the inheritance is considered as a fictitious being, representing
in every respect the deceased who was the owner of the estate."
9. See comments in PROJET OF LA. CIVIL CODE OF 1825, 1 LA. LEGAL
ARCHIVES 115, 123 (1937) recommending suppression of La. Digest of 1808, bk.
III, ch. VI, sec. I, art. 74.
10. LA. CIV. CODE art. 940: "A succession is acquired by the legal heir
who is called by law to the inheritance, immediately after the death of the
deceased to whom he succeeds." LA. CIv. CODE art. 953: "In order to be able
to inherit, the heir must exist at the moment the succession becomes open."
11. Which means that the commorientes will be considered as having
died simultaneously. This is implicit from the provisions of LA. CIV. CODE
arts. 76, 953.
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exception to determine the order of death. If there are no
circumstances of the fact from which the order of death can
be ascertained, the necessary proof is replaced by the pre-
sumptions established in articles 938 and 939. As an exception
to the rule that the prior death of the de cujus must be
proved, the presumptions must be strictly construed. They
cannot be extended by implication or by analogy, and
moreover, all the conditions required by article 936 must con-
cur.12 Thus, when the reciprocal right to inherit does not
exist,'13 or when it exists solely by virtue of a testament, 14 the
presumptions are inapplicable. In short, the presumptions are
intended to be used only to determine the order of death in
the devolution of a succession ab intestato.'5
In Collins v. Becnel,' 6 defendant attempted to invoke the
survivorship presumptions to defeat the rights of the plain-
tiffs to sue for the wrongful death of their sister who, along
with her only child, had been killed in an automobile accident.
Defendant theorized that since it was impossible to determine
from the circumstances of the fact which of the commorientes
had died first, the presumptions applied. Hence, the child,
presumed to have survived the mother, had the right to sue
rather than the brothers and sisters. The court, however,
properly concluded that articles 938 and 939 cannot be ex-
tended to determine the beneficiaries of wrongful death ac-
tions, under Louisiana Civil Code article 2315, for neither the
12. (1) The commorientes must be reciprocally entitled to inherit from
one another; (2) the commorientes must have perished in the same accident;
(3) there must not be any circumstances from which the order of their deaths
can be established.
13. For example, the commorientes are husband and wife and there are
children of the marriage; the commorientes are the blood parent and his child
who has been adopted by another, in which case the child retains the right to
inherit from his blood parent, but the parent loses his right to inherit from
his child. LA. CIV. CODE art. 214.
14. See Succession of Langles, 105 La. 39, 29 So. 739 (1900), holding that
since mother and daughter were reciprocally entitled to inherit from one
another, the fact that they had also made reciprocal testaments disposing of
their estates in favor of each other and thus conforming to what the law had
established in their favor, did not operate to preclude the application of the
survivorship presumptions. It is implicit in the decision that if the reciprocal
right had existed solely by virtue of the reciprocal testaments, the presump-
tions would not have been applicable. See also 4 M. PLANIOL ET G. RIPERT ET
H. VIALLETON, TRAITIt PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRAN(AIS, Nos. 32 et seq. at
67 (2d ed. 1956).
15. Planiol, supra, note 14 at 76.
16. 297 So. 2d 506 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974).
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survival nor the wrongful death action is a right of inheri-
tance.
17
COLLATION
In Estate of Schwegman v. Schwegman,'5 plaintiff at-
tacked a conveyance of a parcel of land by the de cujus to one
of his children, alternatively as a simulation or a donation in
disguise subject to collation. The decedent conveyed the land
in 1966 in the form of a sale for a recited price of $6,500. At
the time of the death of the de cujus in 1969, the property had
an appraised value of $43,000. It having been established that
the vendor had not remained in possession of the land and
that the recited price had actually been paid, the court held
that neither article 2444 nor 2480 of the Civil Code was appli-
cable.1 9 There being no proof of the value of the land at the
time of the sale, it was impossible for the court to determine
whether the price paid was below one-fourth its actual value 20
or whether the price paid was a very low price; 2 1 it remanded
the case to the lower court to determine this vital issue.
17. Cf. Doucet v. Travelers Ins. Co., 91 F. Supp. 864 (W.D. La. 1950). See
Hoy v. Stuyvesant Ins. Co., 141 So. 2d 908 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962) (Father and
child were killed in an auto accident. There being no way of establishing the
order of their deaths, and when the suit for wrongful death was filed by the
brothers and sisters of the deceased child, applying the presumption, the
court held that the father had died first so that, there being no surviving
parent nor children of the deceased child, under the then provisions of LA.
Civ. CODE art. 2315, the right to sue for wrongful death belonged to the
brothers and sisters of the deceased child). It is suggested, however, that the
same result could have been reached without the application of the presump-
tions had the court adopted the rationale of Collins v. Beenel, i.e. neither the
father nor the child had actually survived each other. Cf. LA. R.S. 22:645
(1958); Morelock v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 222 La. 712, 63 So. 2d 612 (1953).
18. 298 So. 2d 795 (La. 1974).
19. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2444: "The sales of immovable property made by
parents to their children, may be attacked by the forced heirs, as containing
a donation in disguise, if the latter can prove that no price has been paid, or
that the price was below one-fourth of the real value of the immovable sold,
at the time of the sale." LA. CIV. CODE art. 2480: "In all cases where the thing
sold remains in the possession of the seller, because he has reserved to
himself the usufruct, or retains possession by a precarious title, there is
reason to presume that the sale is simulated, and with respect to third
persons, the parties must produce proof that they are acting in good faith,
and establish the reality of the sale."
20. Had it been below one-fourth its actual value, the transaction would
have been classified as a donation under LA. CIV. CODE art. 2444.
21. Had it been a very low price, the difference between the price paid
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITIONS
Formal Requirements
By far the most important decison in this area is Succes-
sion of Boyd 22 in which the Louisiana Supreme Court upheld
an olographic testament dated "2-8-72." For many years the
jurisprudence had been confused and indecisive as to the
extent to which extrinsic evidence was admissible to resolve
uncertainties or ambiguities in dates appearing in olographic
testaments. For a time, it was believed that the two Succes-
sion of Gaudin cases decided by the First Circuit Court of
Appeal 23 had settled the question in favor of the admissibility
of such evidence, but subsequent decisions 24 soon reverted to
the strict rule of Succession of Beird25 that an olographic will
in which the slash date form is used is invalid for lack of a
date certain, the date being an essential part of the testa-
ment that must be determined from the face of the testament
itself, and that must be so written as to leave no room for
doubt or speculation. In Boyd, the Louisiana Supreme Court
finally puts at rest the controversy. After a thorough review
of the jurisprudence, it adopts the rationale of the Gaudin
decisions and holds that although an absent date cannot be
supplied, there is no reason why extrinsic evidence should not
be admissible to prove an uncertain date. Id certum est quod
certum reddi potest.26 Beird and its progeny are overruled.
In Succession of Smith v. Domangue27 the testator's nun-
cupative will by public act, written in English, was attacked
as a nullity on the alleged grounds that the testatrix knew no
English; hence, she must have dictated the testament to the
bilingual notary in French, the only language she was alleged
to have known.28 The issue was, therefore, whether the tes-
and the fair price of the thing sold would be subject to collation under LA.
CIV. CODE art. 1248.
22. 306 So. 2d 687 (La. 1975).
23. 140 So. 2d 384 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962); 98 So. 2d 711 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1957).
24. Succession of Koerkel, 174 So. 2d 213 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965); Succes-
sion of Mayer, 144 So. 2d 896 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
25. Succession of Beird, 145 La. 756, 82 So. 881 (1919).
26. That is certain which is made certain.
27. 297 So. 2d 171 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974).
28. In such a case the will is invalid, there being no opportunity for
comparison between what is dictated and what is actually taken down by the
notary. DeBaillon v. Fuselier, 159 La. 1044, 106 So. 559 (1925).
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tatrix could speak and understand the English language. On
this point, the conflicting testimony did not weigh sufficiently
heavy in favor of the opponents, and accordingly, the court
held that the plaintiff in nullity had failed to discharge his
burden of proof as required by article 2933 of the Code of Civil
Procedure.29
Rights of Legatee to Things Bequeathed
Louisiana Civil Code article 1638 provides that if the
thing bequeathed has been mortgaged by the testator for his
own debt or for that of another, the legatee takes the thing
subject to the encumbrance unless the testator has expressly
provided otherwise.30 In Succession of Waterman,3 1 by the
first disposition in her will the testatrix directed all her just
debts to be paid out of her residuary estate.3 2 She then made
several bequests including a legacy of a parcel of ground
valued at $25,000 which was then encumbered with a $10,000
mortgage to secure an indebtedness of the testatrix. The
Louisiana Supreme Court construed the direction of the tes-
tatrix as constituting an express disposition requiring the
payment of secured and unsecured debts from the residuary
estate,3 3 and accordingly, held that the mortgage on the prop-
29. Under LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 2933, the plaintiff in nullity always bears
the burden of proving the invalidity of a nuncupative testament by public
act. In Succession of Currie, 297 So. 2d 742 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974), the
testator executed a nuncupative testament by private act affixing his mark
thereto instead of signing it. The proponents failed to prove that the testator
did not know how to sign or that he was disabled from so doing, and accord-
ingly the testament was declared invalid. See LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 2903. In
Succession of Cutrer, 297 So. 2d 543 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974), suit was brought
to annul an olographic testament on the grounds that it had not been written
by the testator. Although the action in nullity was instituted more than
three months from the probate of the testament, the court found it unneces-
sary to apply LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 2932 because the preponderance of the
evidence in any event established that the will had actually been written and
signed by the testator.
30. See also LA. CIV. CODE art. 1441: "The particular legatee, who, in
consequence of the hypothecary action has paid the debt or abandoned the
property mortgaged, has no recourse against the heir of the testator, be-
cause, by receiving the legacy, he is considered as having received it with the
incumbrances with which it was charged."
31. 298 So. 2d 731 (La. 1974).
32. Id. at 732: "FIRST: I direct that all my just debts, funeral expenses
and expenses in connection with the administration of my estate be paid out
of my residuary estate, as soon as practicable after my death."
33. The court reasoned that since unsecured debts are taken from the
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
erty bequeathed had to be canceled before delivery to the
legatee. Should the common practice of inserting in wills
payment-of-debts clauses be discontinued?
In Succession of Platt,34 0. F. Platt owned an undivided
interest in a tract of land in Bossier Parish. He died at his
domicile in Texas in 1952 leaving a testament naming his wife
Hattie as his universal legatee. This testament was duly ad-
mitted to probate in Texas and Hattie was sent into posses-
sion. In 1965 Hattie died testate designating Jessie and Rose
Glover as her universal legatees of all her property "wher-
ever situated." Her will was also admitted to probate in Texas.
Authenticated copies of these proceedings were subsequently
presented to the district court in Bossier Parish, which or-
dered them deposited and recorded in the registry of the
court to be executed in accordance with law. The court also
rendered judgment recognizing the Glovers as universal
legatees of Hattie and, as such, entitled to Hattie's undivided
interest in the Bossier Parish property. The sisters and other
relations of 0. F. Platt then filed a petition seeking to have
the wills declared null and ineffective, assuming the untena-
ble position that Hattie had never acquired the property in
dispute because she had failed to file the will of her deceased
husband for probate in Louisiana; that this prevented her
from becoming the owner of the Bossier Parish property, and
that as a result, she could not have bequeathed it to her own
legatees.
Basing its decision on Louisiana Civil Code articles 940
and 944, the court held that, as the testamentary universal
legatee of her husband, Hattie was called by law to the in-
heritance immediately after the death of her husband, and
that, having succeeded to her husband's rights in the prop-
erty from the instant of his death, she could transmit the
succession to her own heirs. The result is correct. However,
articles 940 et seq. relate to the succession ab intestato
wherein the heir becomes the owner of the effects comprised
in the succession of the de cujus at the moment of his death
apd can therefore transmit it to his own heirs, even though
he has died without previously having accepted the succes-
sion. It would have been more appropriate to apply article
residuary estate by operation of law, the disposition or direction of testatrix
would be meaningless unless it referred to secured debts as well.
34. 300 So. 2d 503 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1974).
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1626, which gives every legatee, whether by particular title or
otherwise, a right to the thing bequeathed from the moment
of the death of the testator. The right then may be transmit-
ted by the legatee to his own heirs or legatees. 35
Interpretation of Legacies
"I desire what money I may have-checking account at
Calcasieu Marine National Bank 2 certificates in First
Federal and Loan Association, handled as Mrs. Arguello
sees fit."
In Succession of Baldwin,3 6 the court held that this language
in the will of the testatrix contained a disposition committed
to the choice of a third person. It was therefore null under the
provisions of Louisiana Civil Code article 1573. And in Succes-
sion of Harris v. Pierce,37 the court admitted extrinsic evi-
dence to identify the legatee who was referred to in the tes-
tament simply as "the person who is taking care of me at the
time of my death."38
Revocation of Testaments
In 1952 the Louisiana Supreme Court, although conclud-
ing that the purchase of United States savings bonds payable
upon death to a designated beneficiary constituted an
additional method of making a donation in prospect of death,
nevertheless held that, as a donation mortis causa, it was
subject to all the substantive Civil Code provisions pertaining
to testamentary dispositions, particularly article 1705, which
operates a revocation of a testament antedating the birth of a
35. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1626: "Every legacy under a particular title gives
to the legatee, from the day of the testator's death, a right to the thing
bequeathed, which right may be transmitted to his heirs or assigns; and this
takes place as well in testamentary dispositions, universal or under a univer-
sal title, as in those made under a particular title .
36. 309 So. 2d 808, 809 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975).
37.297 So. 2d 738 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974).
38. The evidence disclosed that the defendant was furnishing room and
board for the testatrix, keeping house for her, and sleeping with her at night.
See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1714: "In case of ambiguity or obscurity in the descrip-
tion of the legatee, as, for instance, when a legacy is bequeathed to one of two
individuals bearing the same name, the inquiry shall be which of the two was
upon terms of the most intimate intercourse or connection with the testator,
and to him shall the legacy be decreed."
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legitimate child.39 In Succession of Stothart,4 0 it was argued
that if the beneficiary designation in a bond is revoked by
operation of law by the subsequent birth of a child, it should
likewise be revoked by a revocation contained in the sub-
sequent will of the de cujus. The Second Circuit Court of
Appeal rejected this argument. It held that, in light of Free v.
Bland,4 1 and Yiatchos v. Yiatchos,4 2 and later Louisiana deci-
sions,a3 the subsequent execution of a testament purporting
to leave the remaining assets of the testator "such as cash,
bonds, savings certificates or otherwise," to designated
legatees did not have the effect of revoking or otherwise af-
fecting the status of United States bonds payable upon death.
It concluded that, except when forced heirship or community
rights are at issue, the designated beneficiary of the bonds is
the absolute owner of them, In passing, the court theorized
that, in view of the decisions of the United States Supreme
Court, Winsberg v. Winsbergaa might not have been decided
the same way today, particularly in so far as it required the
beneficiary to account for the full value of the bonds.
DONATIONS INTER VIVOS
Animus Donandi
In T. L. James & Co. v. Montgomery,4 5 when the deceased
visited his oldest son he had with him $11,940 in cash in a
brown paper bag, he rented a safety deposit box in the name
of the son, and he placed the money in the box. None of this
money was removed or used by the son until after the death
of his father. In this suit, the widow of the deceased father,
apparently invoking Louisiana Civil Code article 2404,46
39. Winsberg v. Winsberg, 220 La. 398, 56 So. 2d 730 (1952).
40. 303 So. 2d 315 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1974).
41. 369 U.S. 663 (1962).
42. 376 U.S. 306 (1964).
43. Succession of Guerre, 197 So. 2d 738 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967); Succes-
sion of Videau, 197 So. 2d 655 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967).
44. 220 La. 398, 56 So. 2d 730 (1952).
45. 308 So. 2d 481 (La. App. 1st Cii. 1975), cert. denied, 310 So. 2d 856
(1975). For discussion of other issues in this case, see The Work of the
Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1974-1975 Term-Trusts and Estate Plan-
ning, 36 LA. L. REV. 446 (1976).
46. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2404: "But if it should be proved that the husband
has sold the common property, or otherwise disposed of the same by fraud, to
injure his wife, she may have her action against the heirs of the husband, in
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sought the return of the money by the son alleging that it
represented the proceeds of the sale of community im-
movables sold by her husband. Considering the circumstances
surrounding the transaction,47 the court concluded that the
father did not intend to make a manual gift of the money to
the son.
A related but different question was presented in Allen v.
Allen. 48 Mr. and Mrs. Allen opened a joint savings account in
a California bank in their own names, ostensibly for their
minor children. They retained the authority to make with-
drawals at any time. The question presented was whether the
funds on deposit were assets of the community formerly exist-
ing between the spouses, or whether they belonged to the
children. The latter question, in turn, depended upon whether
the parents had made a valid donation inter vivos. Relying on
Gibson v. Hearne,4 9 the Second Circuit Court of Appeal held
that the deposit for the minors constituted a valid donation of
the money under article 1539,50 a good delivery having been
effected through the deposit in the name of the parents as
fiduciaries of the minors.5 ' The fact that the parents retained
control of the money on deposit at all times did not seem to
bother the court. It observed that the "donees" were minors
and that authority to withdraw had to vest in someone,
namely in the parents in their fiduciary capacity. 52
support of her claim on one-half of the property, on her satisfactorily proving
the fraud."
47. It appeared that the deceased and his wife were having marital
difficulties, that his wife had filed suit against him for separation, that he
had changed the beneficiary both in his retirement plan and in his life
insurance contract in favor of the oldest son, and that three months after the
suit for separation was filed, he committed suicide. 308 So. 2d at 483.
48. 301 So. 2d 417 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1974).
49. 164 La. 65, 113 So. 766 (1927).
50. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1539: "The manual gift, that is, the giving of
corporeal movable effects, accompanied by a real delivery, is not subject to
any formality."
51. On the question as to the donors' animus donandi the court said:
"The donor's intent to make irrevocable donations of the funds deposited into
the accounts is manifest from the evidence. [The testimony] was that this
was done for tax purposes, which necessarily presupposes an irrevocable gift
to lawfully receive the tax advantage of separate incomes. The accounts were
continuously carried on in the names of the fiduciaries for the named minor...
no funds were ever withdrawn in the more than ten years since the initial
donations were made." Allen v. Allen, 301 So. 2d 417, 419 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1974).
52. The fact still remains that the donor did not divest himself of the
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Suspensive Conditions
A donation inter vivos is a gratuitous contract whereby
the donor divests himself at present and irrevocably of the
thing given and wlich becomes perfect only upon acceptance
by the donee.53 It should follow, therefore, that when a donor
makes a donation inter vivos in the form provided by law and
it has been duly accepted by the donee in precise terms, its
validity cannot be attacked. The donor's motive for making it
should be of no consequence, even if the donation is designed
to deprive forced heirs of their legitime. 54
Nevertheless, in Succession of Simpson,5 5 in which the de
cujus made a donation inter vivos of an immovable to some of
her children, evidenced by an act passed before a notary and
two witnesses and duly accepted by the donees in authentic
form, and the donation and the acceptances of all donees had
been duly recorded as required by law, the court declared the
donation null because it found, from the evidence adduced,
56
that the donor had no intention to divest herself of the prop-
erty until after her death. A gift during the life of the donor,
the court said, not to take effect until after the death of the
donor and not in the form of a testament is a donation causa
mortis reprobated by our law.
With this conclusion the writer cannot agree. Donations
inter vivos may be made subject to any conditions not other-
thing given. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1468. Cf. Succession of Grubbs, 170 So. 2d
256 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 247 La. 409, 171 So. 2d 666 (1965)
(the husband deposited $10,000 in a savings account in the name of his wife,
retaining the authority to withdraw, and it was held that the operation was
not an effective donation of the money, but an attempted donation of an
incorporeal movable, void for lack of form under LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1468,
1536). See also LA. CIv. CODE art. 1531, providing that where the donor has
reserved to himself the liberty of disposing of any object comprised in the
donation there is no donation.
53. LA. Civ. CODE arts. 1468, 1540.
54. Cf. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1492. In such a case the remedy is to seek a
reduction of the donation if it impinges on the legitime of the forced heirs.
LA. CIV. CODE art. 1502.
55. 311 So. 2d 67 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1975).
56. "A letter written by Mrs. Simpson addressed to all of her children
clearly indicates that she executed the donations of the described immovable
property . . . purely to punish Ben and Wayne Simpson for their lack of
cooperation with her and the remainder of their brothers and sisters .... The
testimony and evidence were to the effect that Mrs. Simpson remained in
possession-in fact, never gave up possession of her home in Arcadia." 311 So.
2d at 73.
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wise reprobated by law.57 They may even be made subject to
the suspensive condition that they shall not take effect until
after the death of the donor,58 or subject to the resolutory
condition that the donation shall be resolved if the donor
survives the donee.5 9 The prior death of the donor can thus be
stipulated as either a suspensive or resolutory condition. It is
true that in Succession of Sinnott v. Hibernia National
Bank,60 the court attempted to distinguish between donations
inter vivos, donations causa mortis and donations mortis
causa, stating that the donation causa mortis is a gift during
the life of the donor in expectation of his death, not to take
effect until after the death of the donor. But this is a distinc-
tion without a difference, the court itself recognizing that:
[T]here is nothing, however, in our law which prevents a
donor from imposing upon his donation inter vivos the
condition that it should not be effective until after the
death 1.... I
Even assuming that the donor did not intend the dona-
tion to have any effect until after her death, and admitting
that the testatrix retained possession of the immovable given
during her life, it is submitted that the donation was a valid
donation and that the donor had irrevocably divested herself
of the thing given in that she was thereby precluded from
disposing of the same property in favor of others.6 2
Form
Except in donations of corporeal movables, every dona-
tion inter vivos must be passed before a notary and two wit-
nesses.s In Teachers' Retirement System v. Vial,6 the
57. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1527.
58. Succession of Sinnott v. Hibernia Nat'l Bank, 105 La. 705, 30 So. 233
(1901).
59. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1534: "The donor may stipulate the right of return
of the objects given, either in case of his surviving the donee alone, or in case
of his surviving the donee and his descendants ..
60. 105 La. 705, 30 So. 233 (1901).
61. Id. at 713, 30 So. at 237.
62. Where the parent retains possession of the thing given to one or more
of his children, the remedy provided is a suit to set aside the same as a
simulation if it is proved that the donor actually had no intention to transfer
the ownership of the thing given. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2480. Cf. LA. Civ. CODE
art. 2444.
63. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1536.
64. 317 So. 2d 179 (La. 1975).
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Louisiana Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the
Louisiana Teachers' Retirement System. The court further
recognized that the assignment of the death benefits under
the system to a designated beneficiary in conformity with the
statutory provisions by the mere completion of the appro-
priate forms constituted an additional method of making do-
nations inter vivos without an authentic act.6 5 Because it
apparently was not re-urged on the application for writs, the
Louisiana Supreme Court does not discuss the question ar-
gued before the court of appeal, which held, based on prior
decisions,66 that the death benefit payments under the sys-
tem, like the avails of life insurance contracts, do not form
part of the estate of the retiree, but are payable to the desig-
nated beneficiary under the terms of the assignment.6 7
65. "To the extent that the statutes permit the assignment of death
benefits by mere completion of a printed form, they clearly conflict with the
Civil Code rules on donations. However, where two statutes are in conflict,
the statute that is more specifically directed to the matter at issue must
prevail as an exception to the statute that is more general in character.
Hence, the statutory method by which ... the death benefits are assigned is
an exception to the Civil Code requirements of form ordinarily applicable to
donations, and, as such, the assignment is not subject to attack as a donation
invalid for want of form." Id. at 183. Cf. Winsberg v. Winsberg, 220 La. 398, 56
So. 2d 730 (1952) (the U.S. Savings Bond Plan establishes an additional
method of making dispositions mortis causa, notwithstanding that it is not in
the form prescribed by the Civil Code). See also Succession of Weis, 162 So. 2d
791 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964).
66. Succession of Mendoza, 288 So. 2d 673 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973); Suc-
cession of Rockvoan, 141 So. 2d 498 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
67. Teachers' Retirement System v. Vial, 304 So. 2d 53 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1974). It is interesting to note that neither the court of appeal nor the
supreme court discusses the fact that the retiree retains the power to change
the beneficiary, and consequently never divests himself irrevocably of the
thing given. Cf. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1468.
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